Criminal Forfeiture and the Attorney-Client Relationship: Are Attorneys\u27 Fees up for Grabs by Fossum, Drew J.
SMU Law Review
Volume 39 | Issue 5 Article 6
1985
Criminal Forfeiture and the Attorney-Client
Relationship: Are Attorneys' Fees up for Grabs
Drew J. Fossum
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in SMU Law Review
by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Drew J. Fossum, Criminal Forfeiture and the Attorney-Client Relationship: Are Attorneys' Fees up for Grabs, 39 Sw L.J. 1067 (1985)
https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr/vol39/iss5/6
CRIMINAL FORFEITURE AND THE
ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP:
ARE ATTORNEYS' FEES UP
FOR GRABS?
by Drew J. Fossum
T the prompting of the law-and-order administration of Richard M.
Nixon the Ninety-First Congress enacted new legislation to control
organized crime. I Two of the most important statutes that Congress
passed addressed racketeering 2 and drug trafficking. 3 The laws targeted fa-
miliar problems, but created a revolutionary new weapon in the battle
against organized crime. Both the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Or-
ganizations Act (RICO)4 and the Continuing Criminal Enterprise provisions
of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act (CCE)5 pro-
I. SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, ORGANIZED CRIME CONTROL ACT OF 1969, S.
REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 78-79 (1969). As part of a comprehensive effort to
strengthen federal criminal law, President Nixon advocated new statutes that would attack the
financial resources of criminals, realizing that "[a]s long as the property of organized crime
remains, new leaders will step forward to take the place of those we jail." Id.; COMPTROLLER
GENERAL, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ASSET FORFEITURE-A SELDOM USED
TOOL IN COMBATTING DRUG TRAFFICKING 1 (1981) [hereinafter cited as COMPTROLLER
GENERAL]; see Comment, Criminal Forfeiture: Attacking the Economic Dimension of Organ-
ized Narcotics Trafficking, 32 AM. U.L. REV. 227, 228-29 (1982).
2. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, § 901(a) (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act), Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1961-1968 (1982)). RICO defines racketeering in terms of commission of any of a list of 24
federal and 8 state felonies, including: murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery,
extortion, dealing in narcotics and dangerous drugs, white slave trafficking, and 22 other felo-
nies contained under the criminal laws of the United States. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1982); see H.
MYERS & J. BRZOSTOWSKI, DRUG AGENTS' GUIDE TO FORFEITURE OF ASSETS 303 (1981).
RICO forfeiture applies to persons involved in a pattern of racketeering activity or "at least
two acts of racketeering ... the last of which occurred within ten years ... after the commis-
sion of a prior act of racketeering activity." 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1982). The Act thus aban-
dons the common law notion of crime as an isolated event and instead characterizes modern
organized crime as more of a pattern of behavior than a series of individual acts. See Webb &
Turow, RICO Forfeiture in Practice: A Prosecutorial Perspective, 52 U. CIN. L. REV. 404, 404-
05 (1983).
3. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, § 408 (Continuing
Criminal Enterprise), Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C.
§ 848 (1982)). CCE establishes that a person is guilty of engaging in a continuing criminal
enterprise if: (1) he commits a felony that is enumerated in the statute; and (2) that felony "is
part of a continuing series of violations" undertaken by that person in concert with five or
more persons and "from which such person obtains substantial income or resources." Id.
4. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982).
5. 21 U.S.C. §§ 848 (1982).
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vided for criminal forfeiture of convicted parties' property.6 Since previous
congressional attempts to control organized crime through fines and incar-
ceration had repeatedly failed,7 great hopes attached to the use of forfeiture
to reduce significantly the economic base that gives criminal organizations
their power.8
Application of RICO and CCE forfeiture provisions, however, did not
achieve the lofty goals that Congress and many law enforcement officials had
expressed. 9 In reaction to this legislative failure, Congress conducted hear-
ings on ways to make the statutes more effective. 10 Congress then passed the
Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984,11 which clarified many ambiguities
of the original RICO and CCE forfeiture provisions and reflected congres-
sional intent to broaden the scope of anti-organized crime legislation. 12
The most controversial feature of the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act in-
volves whether the expanded scope of RICO and CCE forfeiture may now
reach attorneys' fees. In the 1984 Act Congress clearly indicated that both
RICO and CCE extend to the proceeds of criminal enterprises and implied
6. Criminal forfeiture authorizes confiscation of all of the defendant's property or finan-
cial resources that have some relation.to his criminal activity. See Comment, supra note 1, at
229. The forfeiture provisions of RICO and CCE, which are similar in effect, contain only
minor textual differences. Consequently, all references to one of the provisions also apply to
the other unless otherwise noted. See infra notes 42-59 and accompanying text.
7. See SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON
INVESTIGATIONS, ORGANIZED CRIME AND ILLICIT TRAFFIC IN NARCOTICS, S. REP. No. 72,
89th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1965); Comment, supra note 1, at 227-28. Early attempts at control-
ling narcotics failed in part because they primarily targeted possession and addiction rather
than distribution and sale of drugs. See W. ELDRIDGE, NARCOTICS AND THE LAW 49-103 (2d
ed. 1967) (empirical analysis of American narcotics legislation).
8. Advocates of criminal forfeiture explained that RICO and CCE provided a threefold
attack on organized crime. Senator McClellan, one sponsor of RICO, stated that the statute
"attacks the problem by providing a means of wholesale removal of organized crime from our
organizations, prevention of their return, and, where possible, forfeiture of their ill-gotten
gains." 116 CONG. REC. 591 (1970) (statement of Sen. McClellan); see Weiner, Crime Must
Not Pay: RICO Criminal Forfeiture in Perspective, 1 N. ILL. U.L. REV. 225, 239-40 (1981).
9. A variety of sources describe the actual effect of RICO and CCE on organized crime
as inconsequential. In the ten-year period following enactment of RICO and CCE federal
prosecutors obtained only 97 indictments constituting actual and potential forfeitures of only
two million dollars. COMPTROLLER GENERAL, supra note 1, at 49. The actual volume of the
drug trade in this country, however, is enormous. In 1979 between $55 and $73 billion worth
of illicit drugs changed hands in the United States. See Hughes & O'Connell, In Personam
(Criminal) Forfeiture and Federal Drug Felonies: An Expansion of a Harsh English Tradition
into a Modern Dilemma, II PEPPERDINE L. REV. 613, 615 (1984). In 1981 estimates placed
the value of the domestic drug trade at $80 billion. Bensinger, Blank Cartridges, Wash. Post,
Oct. 8, 1981, at A31, col. 2, cited in Comment, supra note 1, at I.
10. See DEA Oversight and Budget Authorization: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Se-
curity and Terrorism of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 52 (1982);
Forfeiture of Narcotics Proceeds: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1980). For a detailed review of the
events leading up to passage of the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984, see S. REP. No.
225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 191, 191-92, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 3182,
3374-80 [hereinafter cited as SENATE FORFEITURE REPORT].
11. See Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 302, 98 Stat. 2040
(1984) (codified at 18 U.S.C.A. § 1963 (West Supp. 1985); 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 848-53 (West Supp.
1985)).
12. See SENATE FORFEITURE REPORT, supra note 10, at 191-92.
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that no exceptions to either statute's forfeiture provision exist.' 3 Conse-
quently, prosecutors have begun to seek RICO and CCE indictments by al-
leging not only forfeitability of crime-related assets and criminal proceeds,
but also forfeitability of attorneys' fees. 14 The criminal defense bar stead-
fastly opposes such an interpretation of the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act
on two grounds. Defense attorneys claim that: (1) such an interpretation
violates a defendant's constitutional right to counsel; and (2) allowing forfei-
ture of attorneys' fees jeopardizes the attorney-client privilege.' 5
The district courts that have considered the scope of the Comprehensive
Forfeiture Act have reached differing results. The disagreement primarily
involves: (1) whether prosecutors can apply RICO and CCE forfeiture to
attorneys' fees; and (2) whether these laws subject attorneys' fee information
to subpoenas. 16 The one appellate decision on the subject has failed to re-
solve the conflict between district court interpretations of RICO and CCE.1
7
In order to explain its value in the battle against organized crime, this
Comment first examines the historical background of criminal forfeiture as
well as modern statutory enactments of the common law doctrine. The dis-
cussion then focuses on the right to counsel and the attorney-client privilege
as a preface for analysis and critique of the developing case law that inter-
prets criminal forfeiture under RICO and CCE. A final section argues that
courts have incorrectly interpreted RICO and CCE as providing an attor-
neys' fees exception to the scope of forfeitable property and suggests a reso-
lution of the constitutional conflict surrounding the two statutes that
preserves both the defendant's rights and the efficacy of criminal forfeiture.
I. THE LAW OF FORFEITURE
A. The Common Law Background of Criminal Forfeiture
Criminal forfeiture has become a new addition to the federal prosecutor's
arsenal in the battle against organized crime, but the concept of forced for-
feiture of assets antedates modern civilization. Forfeiture enhanced law en-
forcement efforts in Old Testament Israel" and in ancient Greece and
13. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1963 (West Supp. 1985); 21 U.S.C.A. § 848 (West Supp. 1985).
14. See, e.g., Payden v. United States, 605 F. Supp. 839, 849 n.14 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on
other grounds, 767 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1985) (court interpreted CCE to encompass forfeiture of
attorneys' fees although indictment alleged only general forfeiture); United States v. Rogers,
602 F. Supp. 1332, 1334-35 (D. Colo. 1985) (court found government's contention of forfeita-
bility of attorneys' fees under RICO unsupported by legislative history).
15. Statement of Ronald I. Meshbesher, President, National Association of Criminal De-
fense Lawyers, to the Committee on Criminal Advocacy of the New York City Bar Associa-
tion 3-5 (Mar. 20, 1985) [hereinafter cited as Statement of Meshbesher].
16. See Payden v. United States, 605 F. Supp. 839, 844-84 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other
grounds, 767 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332, 1334-35 (D.
Colo. 1985).
17. Payden v. United States, 767 F.2d 26, 29-30 (2d Cir. 1985).
18. Both commentators and courts have traced the concept of criminal forfeiture back to
Exodus 21:28 and its requirement that "[i]f an ox gore a man or a woman, that they die: then
the ox shall be surely stoned, and his flesh shall not be eaten; but the owner of the ox shall be
quit." Id.; see Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 681 & n. 17 (1974);
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Rome. 19 The forfeiture device was extensively used in the common law of
England20 and, to a lesser extent, in colonial America. 21
The early law of forfeiture evolved along two separate lines. First, courts
applied forfeiture as an in personam22 penalty pursuant to a finding of per-
sonal guilt, much like other in personam penalties.23 Second, courts also
utilized forfeiture as an in rem 24 penalty that was independent of personal
guilt and based on the legal fiction that property that is used in a crime
becomes evil or tainted. 25 In personam forfeiture provided the conceptual
foundation for the modem law of criminal forfeiture; in rem forfeiture, on
the other hand, became the modem doctrine of civil forfeiture. 26 With the
exception of several comparative references, this Comment focuses exclu-
sively on in personam or criminal forfeiture.
In contrast to in rem forfeiture, 27 in personam forfeiture did not last long
in the young American republic. Discontent with the harsh, feudally based
common law notions of estate forfeiture led to constitutional prohibition of
both forfeiture of estate and the related doctrine of corruption of the blood
as penalties for treason.28 The first legislature extended the ban on in per-
Comment, Criminal Forfeiture and the Necessity for a Post-Seizure Hearing: Are CCE and
RICO Rackets for the Government?, 57 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 776, 780 n.17 (1983).
19. Comment, supra note 18, at 780.
20. The English common law recognized at least three types of forfeiture. The first type
applied to the property of convicted felons and required transfer of the felon's personal prop-
erty to either the Crown or the felon's lord. The second type authorized forfeiture of specific
property used in violation of a statute. The third, "deodand," required either the forfeiture of
the property responsible for the death of another or payment of the assessed value of the piece
of property. See 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *420-2 1; O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON
LAW 7-17 (1881). For discussions of early English forfeiture doctrines, see 3 W. HOLDS-
WORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 371-88 (5th ed. 1942); Finkelstein, The Goring Ox:
Some Historical Perspectives on Deodands, Forfeitures, Wrongful Death and the Western Notion
of Sovereignty, 46 TEMP. L.Q. 169, 170-206 (1973). For a discussion of the modern English
law of forfeiture, see Wasik, The Hodgson Committee Report on the Profits of Crime and Their
Recovery, 1984 CRIM. L. REV. 708, 708-13, 717-20.
21. Weiner, supra note 8, at 231.
22. In personam forfeiture applies regardless of the property's involvement in the criminal
act. Id. at 230.
23. Incarceration and death represent two common examples of in personam penalties
applied against the person rather than against his property. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
711 (5th ed. 1979).
24. In rem actions name a res or thing as defendant and apply penalties directly to the
property. See, e.g., United States v. One 1971 Lincoln Continental Mark III, 460 F.2d 273,
274-75 (8th Cir. 1972) (when government seeks forfeiture of property, property owner in civil
in rem action may move to suppress evidence).
25. See Comment, supra note 1, at 233.
26. Id.
27. In rem forfeiture enjoyed great popularity in the United States. Early judicial applica-
tions included forfeiture of ships and slaves. See United States v. Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. (2
How.) 210, 237 (1844) (actions of captain and crew found to bind ship itself in an in rem
forfeiture action); Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, § 12, 1 Stat. 29, 39. Subsequent applications
have covered everything from airplanes to meat. See 19 U.S.C. § 1306 (1982) (tainted meat
forfeitable); 49 U.S.C. § 782 (1982) (vehicles and aircraft forfeitable if used to smuggle contra-
band). In rem forfeiture remained the main tool for combatting organized crime until 1970.
See Legislative Note, Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 4 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 546, 624
(1971).
28. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 2 establishes that: "The Congress shall have Power to
declare the Punishment of Treason, but no Attainder of Treason shall work Corruption of
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sonam forfeiture of estate and corruption of the blood to felony convictions
as well. 29 The only congressional application of in personam forfeiture prior
to 1970 was a confiscation act of 186230 that allowed the President to seize
property estates of Confederate soldiers.
3 1
In 1970 Congress revived in personam forfeiture in the United States by
enacting criminal in personam forfeiture provisions in both RICO and
CCE.32 These statutory criminal forfeiture provisions, as originally enacted,
differed from civil forfeiture in two major ways. The first difference involved
the applicable burden of proof.33 In criminal forfeiture actions the prosecu-
tion must prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.34 In civil
forfeiture actions, as in all civil actions, the prosecution must meet the pre-
ponderance of the evidence standard.
35
A second difference between statutory criminal forfeiture provisions and
civil forfeiture involved the time at which forfeiture occurs. At common law
and under the 1970 CCE and RICO forfeiture provisions, property was
criminally forfeitable only upon conviction of the defendant. 36 The forfei-
ture did not relate back to the time of the crime and, as a result, any disposi-
tion of the property prior to actual conviction made forfeiture impossible.
37
Conversely, under civil forfeiture the forfeitable property becomes guilty or
tainted from the time of its illegal use. 38 Thus, although the actual forfeiture
proceeding takes place much later, the court deems the property to be
Blood, or Forfeiture except during the Life of the Person attainted." The Constitution thus
abolished the harsh English doctrines only for the specific offense of treason. One commenta-
tor has speculated that the American resentment toward the forfeiture of American property
to the British Crown contributed to the colonial reluctance to utilize forfeiture. Weiner, supra
note 7, at 225, 227. "Corruption of the blood," considered at least as offensive as forfeiture,
prevented a convicted person from inheriting property, retaining property, or transferring
property to an heir. See id. at 230-31.
29. Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 24, 1 Stat. 112, 117 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 3563 (1982)). Many state constitutions also include bans on forfeiture of estate and corrup-
tion of the blood. See Hughes & O'Connell, supra note 9, at 613, 619.
30. Act of July 17, 1862, ch. 195, § 5, 12 Stat. 589, 590.
31. Id. The Supreme Court upheld the 1862 Act over constitutional and statutory chal-
lenges because its forfeiture provisions avoided reliance on either treason or other federal con-
viction. The Act thus did not conflict with the Constitution or with the 1790 forfeiture ban.
See Miller v. United States, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 268, 304-14 (1870); Bigelow v. Forrest, 76 U.S.
(9 Wall.) 339, 349-53 (1869).
32. 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1982); 21 U.S.C. § 848(a) (1982).
33. See Comment, supra note 1, at 234.
34. Id.; see W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 44-45 (1972); Mc-
CORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 339 (E. Cleary ed., 3d ed. 1984).
35. See Clapper v. Lakin, 343 Mo. 710, 123 S.W.2d 27, 33 (1938) (burden of proof by
preponderance of evidence rests upon party asserting affirmative of issue); McBaine, Burden of
Proof: Degrees of Belief, 32 CALIF. L. REV. 242, 245 (1944). Texas in Amrani-Khaldi v. State,
575 S.W.2d 667 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978, no writ), and Oklahoma in OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 2-506(G) (West 1984) deviate from the preponderance of the evidence
standard in civil forfeiture proceedings. In all other jurisdictions proof by preponderance of
the evidence is adequate to establish forfeitability of property. See H. MYERS & J. BRZOSTOW-
SKI, supra note 2, at 15.
36. See Comment, supra note 1, at 234.
37. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1982); 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1982).
38. See Comment, supra note 1, at 234.
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divested from the owner as of the date of the crime.39 A defendant who
transfers property after the date of the crime transfers voidable title, and
even good faith purchasers may lose title to property that the court finds
subject to forfeiture. 40 Due to the different natures of the two forfeiture ac-
tions, acquittal of the defendant or failure to achieve criminal forfeiture does
not bar a subsequent civil forfeiture action. 4 1
B. RICO and CCE
The specific forfeiture provisions contained in section 1963 of RICO and
section 848 of CCE target racketeers and drug traffickers, respectively. 42
RICO section 1963 authorizes forfeiture of any interest in an enterprise in
violation of the substantive anti-racketeering provisions of the Act.43 Under
CCE forfeiture applies to a party who is convicted of engaging in a continu-
ing criminal enterprise. The statute allows confiscation of the profits of such
an enterprise as well as any interest affording influence over the enterprise. 44
The most significant difference between the forfeiture provisions of the two
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. See M. GREEN, BASIC CIVIL PROCEDURE 201-07 (1972). Likewise, failure to achieve
civil forfeiture does not bar a subsequent allegation of criminal forfeiture. Id. Neither dismis-
sal of a criminal forfeiture proceeding nor acquittal of the defendant affects a subsequent civil
forfeiture proceeding. Civil and criminal forfeiture, although sharing the same factual basis,
are separate and independent actions. See H. MYERS & J. BRZOSTOWSKI, supra note 2, at 46.
42. See SENATE FORFEITURE REPORT, supra note 10, at 193.
43. 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1982). RICO § 1963 provides:
(a) Whoever violates any provision of section 1962 of this chapter ... shall
be fined not more than $25,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or
both, and shall forfeit to the United States (1) any interest he has acquired or
maintained in violation of section 1962 .... and (2) any interest in, security of,
claim against, or property or contractual right of any kind affording a source of
influence over, any enterprise which he has established, operated, controlled,
conducted, or participated in the conduct of, in violation of section 1962....
(c) Upon conviction of a person under this section, the court shall authorize
the Attorney General to seize all property or other interest declared forfeited
under this section upon such terms and conditions as the court shall deem
proper. If a property right or other interest is not exercisable or transferable for
value by the United States, it shall expire, and shall not revert to the convicted
person.
Id.
44. 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1982). CCE provides that:
(a) Penalties; forfeitures
(1) Any person who engages in a continuing criminal enterprise shall be
sentenced to a term of imprisonment which may not be less than 10 years and
which may be up to life imprisonment, to a fine of not more than $100,000, and
to the forfeiture prescribed in paragraph (2); except that if any person engages in
such activity after one or more prior convictions of him under this section have
become final, he shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment which may not be
less than 20 years and which may be up to life imprisonment, to a fine of not
more than $200,000, and to the forfeiture prescribed in paragraph (2).
(2) Any person who is convicted under paragraph (1) of engaging in a con-
tinuing criminal enterprise shall forfeit to the United States-
(A) the profits obtained by him in such enterprise, and
(B) any of his interest in, claim against, or property or contractual rights
of any kind affording a source of influence over, such enterprise.
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Acts results from Congress's explicit inclusion of profits as forfeitable assets
under CCE.45
Congress intended the forfeiture provisions to give law enforcement au-
thorities an effective "hit them where they hurt" 46 mechanism for attacking
the economic power base of organized crime.4 7 The statutes, through tradi-
tional fines, incarceration, and civil forfeiture, as well as criminal forfeiture,
thus aimed at three targets: the individual criminal, the property used in the
criminal activity, and the proceeds of the illicit activity.48  Numerous
passages in the statements of purpose and legislative history of RICO and
CCE emphasize congressional intent to provide for expansive criminal
forfeiture. 4
9
Although the forfeiture provisions appeared to provide the ideal opportu-
nity for confiscating the spoils of organized criminal activity,5 0 RICO and
CCE forfeiture failed to live up to original expectations. The Department of
Justice brought only ninety-eight prosecutions for drug violations during the
first ten years of operation under RICO and CCE. The prosecutions eventu-
ally recovered less than two million dollars. 51 The lack of success in enforc-
ing RICO and CCE derived in part from prosecutorial hesitancy to rely on
such a new and untested idea. To a great extent, however, inadequacies in
(b) "Continuing criminal enterprise" defined
For purposes of subsection (a) of this section, a person is engaged in a contin-
uing criminal enterprise if-
(1) he violates any provision of this subchapter or subchapter II of this
chapter the punishment for which is a felony, and
(2) such violation is a part of a continuing series of violations of this sub-
chapter or subchapter II of this chapter-
(A) which are undertaken by such person in concert with five or more
other persons with respect to whom such person occupies a position of orga-
nizer, a supervisory position, or any other position of management, and
(B) from which such person obtains substantial income or resources.
Id.
45. For a detailed comparison of RICO and CCE forfeiture provisions, see H. MYERS &
J. BRzosToWSKI, supra note 2, at 327.
46. United States v. Martino, 681 F.2d 952, 957 n.17 (5th Cir. 1982) (Politz, J.,
dissenting).
47. SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, ORGANIZED CRIME CONTROL ACT OF 1969, S.
REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 79 (1969). See generally G. BLAKEY, TECHNIQUES IN THE
INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF ORGANIZED CRIME: MATERIALS ON RICO (1980)
(background of RICO with emphasis on enforcement); Note, RICO: Are the Courts Constru-
ing the Legislative History Rather than the Statute Itself?, 55 NOTRE DAME LAW. 777 (1980)
(analyses of RICO legislative history and its interpretation); Project, White Collar Crime: Sec-
ond Annual Survey of Law, 19 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 173, 353-70 (1981) (analysis of early appli-
cations of RICO).
48. See Weiner, supra note 8, at 235-36.
49. The preamble to the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968
(1982) provides that:
It is the purpose of this Act to seek the eradication of organized crime in the
United States by strengthening the legal tools in the evidence-gathering process,
by establishing new penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced sanctions
and new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of those engaged in organ-
ized crime.
50. 116 CONG. REC. 591 (1970) (statement of Sen. McClellan).
51. See COMPTROLLER GENERAL, supra note 1, at 11. Between 1970 and 1980, 73 cases
were brought under CCE, 16 under RICO, and 9 jointly under CCE and RICO. Id.
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the statutory forfeiture provisions caused the failure of criminal forfeiture. 52
The original congressional attempts to create effective criminal forfeiture
provisions engendered two major problems. First, the broadest provisions of
RICO applied only to "interests" 5 3 in the racketeering organization. CCE,
although specifically making profits forfeitable,5 4 failed to differentiate be-
tween gross profits and net profits.55 These ambiguities resulted in restric-
tive court interpretations that limited RICO forfeiture to interests other than
profits56 and restricted CCE forfeitures to net profits, which are difficult to
prove conclusively. 57
Second, both RICO and CCE applied the traditional in personam version
of forfeiture that provides for divestiture of property only upon conviction of
the defendant. Since criminal forfeiture does not relate back to the time of
the crime, the statutes limit the government's ability to prevent defendants
from protecting or disposing of potentially forfeitable assets. 58 RICO and
CCE provide mechanisms designed to prevent preconviction shielding of for-
feitable property, but only application of the taint theory of civil in rem for-
feiture would render such transactions voidable.
59
C. Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984
Congress passed the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984 in an attempt
to remedy the inadequacies of RICO and CCE.6° The Act, which was part
of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, provided several major
changes in the provisions of RICO and CCE. The first change addressed
judicial uncertainty with respect to forfeitability of proceeds from a criminal
enterprise under RICO. The Act explicitly made subject to forfeiture both
52. See Hughes & O'Connell, supra note 9, at 621-22.
53. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1982).
54. 21 U.S.C. § 848(a)(2)(A) (1982).
55. See Hughes & O'Connell, supra note 9, at 622.
56. See, e.g., United States v. McManigal, 708 F.2d 276, 284 (7th Cir.), vacated, 104 S. Ct.
419, 78 L. Ed. 2d 355 (1983); United States v. Marubeni Am. Corp., 611 F.2d 763, 766-67 (9th
Cir. 1980).
57. For an example of the difficulty in court calculation of net profits, see United States v.
Jeffers, 532 F.2d 1101, 1117 (7th Cir. 1976), affid in part, 432 U.S. 137 (1977).
58. S. REP. No. 520, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1982). The report explained that whereas
civil forfeiture means that the government takes possession of the property at or soon after the
forfeiture action's commencement, in criminal forfeiture the defendant generally retains con-
trol of the asset until or after his criminal conviction. Any forward-thinking criminal therefore
has both an incentive and an opportunity "to transfer his assets or remove them from the
jurisdiction of the court prior to trial and so shield them from any possibility of forfeiture." Id.
59. Id. The report stated that only the authority to obtain a restraining order allows the
government to prevent a defendant from circumventing forfeiture, but such restraining orders
are only statutorily authorized in the post-indictment period. No protective order is thus
available to the government even in cases where a person disposes of assets in anticipation of
the government's filing criminal charges against him. If the government does obtain a re-
straining order a defendant can defy it, circumvent forfeiture by disposing of his property, and
yet face no greater risk than possible contempt sanctions. The defendant would thus escape
any economic impact of the forfeiture sanction. Id.; see also SENATE FORFEITURE REPORT,
supra note 10, at 196 (analysis of pre-amendment forfeiture inadequacies).
60. Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 302, 98 Stat. 2040
[hereinafter referred to in the text as the Act].
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direct and indirect proceeds of organizations that violate the substantive pro-
visions of RICO section 1962.61 When Congress drafted the Act circuit
court rulings conflicted on that issue, 62 but the Supreme Court preempted
Congress in Russelo v. United States63 by recognizing that RICO forfeiture
encompassed proceeds of racketeering activity. 64
Second, the Act established that profits under CCE and RICO meant
gross profits rather than net profits. 65 This clarification eliminated the pros-
ecutor's burden to calculate the expenses of an illicit enterprise and then
deduct that amount from the business's profits to determine a forfeitable
amount. 66 Consequently, passage of the Act substantially eased the burden
of proof in forfeiture actions.
Finally, the Act codified the taint theory of in rem forfeiture. RICO sec-
tion 1963(c) now provides that title to forfeited property vests in the United
States as of the commission of the criminal act, not at the time of conviction
of its owner. 67 Under the current statute the forfeitable property becomes
tainted at the time that the RICO or CCE violation occurs, and courts can
61. RICO § 1963, as amended by the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984, includes as
forfeitable property:





(C) claim against; or
(D) property or contractual right of any kind affording a source of in-
fluence over; any enterprise which the person has established, operated,
controlled, conducted, or participated in the conduct of, in violation of
section 1962 ... ; and
(3) any property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds which the per-
son obtained, directly or indirectly, from racketeering activity or unlawful debt
collection in violation of section 1962.
18 U.S.C.A. § 1963(a) (West Supp. 1985).
62. See United States v. McManigal, 708 F.2d 276, 283-87 (7th Cir. 1983) ("any interest"
provision of RICO held not to include income, proceeds, or profits); United States v. Martino,
681 F.2d 952, 961-62 (5th Cir. 1982) (insurance proceeds obtained by arson ring held forfeita-
ble under RICO), affid sub nom. Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16 (1983); United States
v. Marubeni Am. Corp., 611 F.2d 763, 776 (9th Cir. 1980) (interpreting RICO as providing for
forfeiture of direct interests in racketeering activity but not proceeds of that activity).
63. 464 U.S. 16 (1983).
64. Id. at 23.
65. 21 U.S.C.A. § 848 (West Supp. 1985).
66. Id.
67. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1963(c) (West Supp. 1985). Section 1963(c) of RICO, as amended by
the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984 provides that:
(c) All right, title, and interest in property described in subsection (a) vests
in the United States upon the commission of the act giving rise to forfeiture
under this section. Any such property that is subsequently transferred to a per-
son other than the defendant may be the subject of a special verdict of forfeiture
and thereafter shall be ordered forfeited to the United States, unless the trans-
feree establishes in a hearing pursuant to subsection (m) that he is a bona fide
purchaser for value of such property who at the time of purchase was reasonably




thus void any transfer of the property.68 RICO provides one exception to
the taint theory. If a defendant sells tainted property for value to a bona fide
purchaser without actual or constructive notice that the property was sub-
ject to forfeiture, the transfer will stand.69
Although the passage of RICO and CCE in 1970 created extensive legisla-
tive history and discussion of statutory purpose, very few interpretive aids
accompanied the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984.70 The Act, how-
ever, clearly manifested two general purposes. First, Congress objected to
the unwillingness of federal prosecutors to implement criminal forfeiture
under either RICO or CCE.7 1 Second, Congress desired to reverse the nar-
row interpretations that courts had given the statutes.72 Armed with a new
understanding of the way that Congress intended criminal forfeiture to oper-
ate, federal prosecutors quickly began to seek RICO and CCE forfeitures
more vigorously than ever before. 73
II. THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL AND THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
The application of recently expanded federal criminal forfeiture to attor-
neys' fees and fee information raises several issues in two important areas.
First, the extension of criminal forfeiture to attorneys' fees and fee informa-
tion may contravene a defendant's constitutional right to counsel. Second,
the expansion of criminal forfeiture into these areas could conflict with the
attorney-client privilege. This section of the Comment briefly summarizes
the right to counsel and the attorney-client privilege. The next section ex-
plores the potential problems that criminal forfeiture of attorneys' fees raises
in these areas and analyzes judicial considerations of these problems.
The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution creates the legal
right to assistance of counsel in all criminal cases. 74 The Supreme Court has
expanded this right to include the right of indigent or illiterate defendants to
have counsel appointed for them in cases involving potential imprison-
ment.75 Furthermore, the Court has held that the right to counsel does not
68. Id.; see Payden v. United States, 605 F. Supp. 839, 849 n.14 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other
grounds, 767 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1985).
69. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1963(c) (West Supp. 1985).
70. The Act passed Congress so rapidly that the copy signed by President Reagan on
October 12, 1984, omitted some material, and the United States Code advance sheet included
provisions not contained in the final version of the statute. See United States v. Rogers, 602 F.
Supp. 1332, 1336 (D. Colo. 1985).
71. See SENATE FORFEITURE REPORT, supra note 10, at 191-92.
72. See id.
73. See Merkle & Moscarino, Are Prosecutors Invading the Attorney-Client Relationship?,
71 A.B.A. J. 38 (1985); Friedman, Prosecutor's Attempts to Seize Lawyer Fees Irk Defense
Attorneys, Wall St. J., Aug. 12, 1985, at 1, col. 1; Siegel, Has US. Put Lawyers on Defensive?,
L.A. Times, June 14, 1985, at 1, col. 1.
74. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
75. The sixth amendment originally did not guarantee court-appointed or publicly subsi-
dized counsel, but instead merely assured a defendant that third parties would not frustrate his
attempts to procure counsel. See Andersen v. Treat, 172 U.S. 24, 29 (1898); W. BEANEY, THE
RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS 27-76 (1972); Note, Sixth Amendment Guaran-
tees Assistance of Counsel that is Reasonably Effective and Does Not Prejudice the Fairness of
the Proceeding, 14 U. BALT. L. REV. 335, 336 (1985). In Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45
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merely require appointment of an attorney, 76 but also implies the right to
effective assistance of competent counsel 77 and that conflicts of interest, 78
inadequate preparation time, or active interference by the state can prevent
exercise of the right. 79 Finally, the court has decreed that a defendant has a
qualified right to counsel of his choice if he can afford his own attorney.80
The attorney-client privilege shares the sixth amendment's foundation in
the jurisprudence of the adversarial system, but is an evidentiary privilege,
not a constitutional right. According to the common law the attorney-client
privilege protects from disclosure any communication between an attorney
and a client or a prospective client when the attorney is acting in a profes-
sional capacity. 8' The most common rationale for the privilege is that only
by protecting communications between an attorney and the client can the
(1932), the Supreme Court first held that the right to counsel includes the right of indigent and
illiterate defendants to have counsel appointed for them in capital cases. Id. at 71. An impor-
tant extension of the right soon followed in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938), in which
the court first made the right to appointed counsel available to all federal felony defendants.
Id. at 463; see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 44 (codifying the Johnson rule); 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(b)
(1982) (amendment to Criminal Justice Act of 1964 excluding petty offenders from the right to
appointed counsel). The Court then extended the sixth amendment right to appointed counsel
to state felony defendants and finally to any state defendants who face the threat of actual
imprisonment. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963) (state felony defendant's
right to assistance of counsel held to be implicit in fourteenth amendment guarantee of fair
trial); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972) (both sixth and fourteenth amendments
held to assure defendant right to counsel if penalty involves actual imprisonment).
76. See Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 446 (1940) (constitutional right to counsel im-
plies opportunity of defendant to meet with counsel).
77. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970).
78. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 349-50 (1980) (actual conflict of interest can
deprive defendant of sixth amendment right to counsel).
79. See Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 91 (1976) (petitioner's sixth amendment
rights violated when prosecutor prevented petitioner from consulting with his counsel during
trial recess); In re Grand Jury Matters, 751 F.2d 13, 19 (1st Cir. 1984) (grand jury subpoenas
presented to defense attorneys in process of representing individuals under investigation by
grand jury held to violate individual's sixth amendment rights); see also Strickland v. Washing-
ton, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693 (1984) (deficient performance by counsel that
creates prejudice to defendant's case constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel and grounds
for reversal); Comment, Effective Assistance of Counsel The Sixth Amendment and the Fair
Trial Guarantee, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 1380, 1385-1426 (1983) (analysis of approaches to deter-
mining effectiveness of counsel).
80. Urquhart v. Lockhart, 726 F.2d 1316, 1319 (8th Cir. 1984); see also Linton v. Perini,
656 F.2d 207, 209 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1162 (1982) (when defendant seeks to
delay trial in order to replace counsel, court must balance defendant's rights against need for
efficient operation of courts). For example, when a defendant attempts to use his right to
counsel to delay the trial, the public's interest in the efficient administration of justice will
foreclose the defendant's right to counsel. See United States v. Burton, 584 F.2d 485, 489
(D.C. Cir. 1978); Amicus Curiae Brief of National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers
at 7-8, United States v. Sheehan, No. 84-198 (E.D. Cal. filed Aug. 9, 1985).
81. See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-59 (D. Mass.
1950). In United Shoe the court provided the following definition of the attorney-client
privilege:
[t]he privilege applies only if (1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought
to become a client; (2) the person to whom the communication was made (a) is a
member of the bar of a court, or his subordinate and (b) in connection with this
communication is acting as a lawyer; (3) the communication relates to a fact of
which the attorney was informed (a) by his client (b) without the presence of
strangers (c) for the purpose of securing primarily either (i) an opinion on law or
(ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in some legal proceeding, and not (d) for the
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attorney assume that the client has fully disclosed all information that is
necessary to formulate an effective defense.8 2
The sixth amendment guarantee of effective assistance of counsel and the
attorney-client privilege overlap to some degree. Both would prevent a de-
fense attorney from divulging confidential client information. 83 One defini-
tion of the attorney-client privilege, the incrimination rationale, defines even
nonconfidential information as privileged if the opposing counsel could use
the information against the defendant. 84 Thus, since the sixth amendment
right to effective assistance of counsel prevents disclosure only of communi-
cations within the confidential attorney-client relationship,8 5 the incrimina-
tion rationale presents broader protection than the sixth amendment.
An issue that is closely related to the scope and applicability of the attor-
ney-client privilege is the ethical precept that prohibits disclosure of "infor-
mation relating to representation of a client."' 86 This precept extends not
only to confidential communication, but also to anything that the client re-
quests the attorney to keep secret or anything that might embarrass the cli-
ent, regardless of the source of the information or the fact that nonclients
also know the information. 87 An attorney must thus consider the conse-
quences of both a legal violation and an ethical violation upon forced or
voluntary disclosure of any client information.8 8
purpose of committing a crime or tort; and (4) the privilege has been (a) claimed
and (b) not waived by the client.
Id.; see Wonneman v. Stratford Sec. Co., 23 F.R.D. 281, 285 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (interpreting
common law privilege).
82. See In re Shargel, 742 F.2d 61, 62 (2d Cir. 1984) (quoting J. WEINSTEIN & M. BER-
GER, EVIDENCE 503(02) (1982)).
83. See United States v. Valencia, 541 F.2d 618, 621 (6th Cir. 1976) (government inform-
ant's disclosure of privileged information also infringed sixth amendment right to counsel);
United States v. King, 536 F. Supp. 253, 264-65 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (sixth amendment right to
counsel and attorney-client privilege both based on confidentiality of communication between
attorney and client). The court in Payden v. United States, 605 F. Supp. 839, 846 (S.D.N.Y.),
rev'd on other grounds, 767 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1985), concluded that the scope of the attorney-
client privilege and information privileged under the sixth amendment coincide.
84. See Payden v. United States, 605 F. Supp. 839, 846 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds,
767 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1985). The incrimination rationale definition of the attorney-client privi-
lege is thus currently the law in at least one circuit.
85. Id.; see United States v. Melvin, 650 F.2d 641, 645 (5th Cir. 1981) (disclosure of
information violates the sixth amendment when such disclosure also violates confidential attor-
ney-client relationship).
86. See Statement of Meshbesher, supra note 15, at 9.
87. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(A), (B) (1979).
88. Another important situation in which this dilemma arises is in the area of tax law.
Recently adopted modifications to the tax code require anyone receiving cash payments in
excess of a statutory minimum to report the cash receipt to the I.R.S. Tax Reform Act of 1984,
26 U.S.C.A. § 6050(I) (West Supp. 1985). The statute also requires the recipient to report the
name, address, and taxpayer identification number of the client making the cash payment. See
Kirsch, War on Lawyers, CAL. LAW., Mar. 1985, at 31, cited in Statement of Meshbesher,
supra note 15, at F-4. The reporting requirement raises the same ethical and attorney-client
privilege issues as the potential disclosure of client information resulting from CCE and RICO
investigations. See Amicus Curiae Brief of the National Association of Criminal Defense Law-
yers in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss at 16, Saint-Veltri v. United States, No. 85-K-501
(D.C. Colo. filed Feb. 21, 1985).
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III. CHALLENGES TO CRIMINAL FORFEITURE OF ATTORNEYS' FEES
The four district courts89 and one appellate court90 that have interpreted
CCE and RICO forfeiture addressed twofold challenges to the statutes.9l
The challenges involve: (1) the effect of procedural mechanisms for enforc-
ing the statutes, such as subpoenas of payment records and other methods of
obtaining fee information from defense counsel, on the attorney-client privi-
lege; and (2) the effect of substantive fee forfeiture itself. The courts' analy-
ses of substantive forfeiture have concentrated on the potential applicability
of an attorneys' fees exception to CCE and RICO. Two of the cases consid-
ered whether Congress intended to create this exception; all of the courts
heard arguments that an attorney's fees exception must be judicially read
into the statutes.92
A. The Threat of Fee Information Disclosure on
the Attorney-Client Relationship
The methods and procedures that federal prosecutors employ potentially
infringe on the attorney-client relationship in several ways. These possible
infringements all involve the use of various information gathering mecha-
nisms that are necessary for preparing cases against individuals and forfeita-
ble property. The most common mechanism is the pre-trial subpoena, 93 but
other devices such as statutory informational hearings and IRS cash disclo-
sure rules may also adversely affect the attorney-client relationship.94
1. Effect of Subpoenas on Trial Preparation. The first possible infringement
on a defendant's rights involves the effect of a government subpoena on de-
fense counsel's readiness for trial. In Payden v. United States95 defense
counsel received a subpoena from the government, followed by a grand jury
subpoena duces tecum for information about counsel's fee arrangement. The
government withdrew the subpoena, and defense counsel filed a motion to
quash the grand jury subpoena. The defendant argued that to respond to a
subpoena at a critical time in such a complicated case would take time and
89. United States v. Ianiello, No. S 85 Cr. 115, slip op. (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 1985); United
States v. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Payden v. United States, 605 F.
Supp. 839 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 767 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v.
Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332 (D. Colo. 1985).
90. Payden v. United States, 767 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1985).
91. Courts have also addressed challenges to criminal forfeiture relying on grounds other
than the potential for violation of the attorney-client privilege and sixth amendment. The
court in Rogers, in addition to issuing the first decision on the attorney-client relationship
challenge, also heard allegations that RICO criminal forfeiture violated the defendant's right
to due process and created an ex post facto law. 602 F. Supp. at 1334. The court rejected
interpretation of RICO as an ex post facto law and similarly disposed of the characterization of
the statute as unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 1340-41. For further analysis of RICO and the
right to procedural due process, see Reed & Gill, RICO Forfeitures, Forfeitable "Interests,"
and Procedural Due Process, 62 N.C.L. REV. 57 (1983).
92. See supra note 89.
93. FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(c).
94. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1963(m) (West Supp. 1985); 26 U.S.C.A. § 6050 (West Supp.
1985).
95. 605 F. Supp. 839 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 767 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1985).
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effort away from preparation of the defense and thereby impair effectiveness
of counsel.
The court cited a First Circuit decision96 that based its holding upon such
an argument, but then stated that even during the pendency of trial the peo-
ple's right to unprivileged information may outweigh the defendant's right to
trial preparation without disruption. 97 The Payden court concluded that de-
fense counsel had sufficient time to prepare for trial, even given the inherent
complexity of a CCE defense.98 The Payden decision, coupled with the First
Circuit's decision in In re Grand Jury Matters,99 leaves open the possibility
that a subpoena of defense counsel in a RICO or CCE case might constitute
a sixth amendment violation based entirely on the distraction posed to the
true defense effort.
2. Threat of Disclosure and the Attorney-Client Relationship. The second
right-to-counsel argument posits that the mere threat that an attorney might
be subpoenaed, called as a witness, forced to disclose cash transactions, or
otherwise compelled to disclose confidential or privileged client information
creates a chilling effect on the attorney-client relationship. 1oo In some cases
such disclosure also could force defense counsel to withdraw from a case,
thus entirely destroying the attorney-client relationship. In another context
the Supreme Court has held that a chilling effect on constitutional rights is
sufficient to justify invalidating a statute. 0 1 Consequently, every court that
has addressed the constitutionality of the Act has considered arguments that
the Act chills the attorney-client relationship.
Four courts have addressed the issue of the chilling effect from forced
disclosure of fee information. 102 Three of the courts have relied on the effect
in one form or another either to invalidate practices requiring such disclo-
sure or to read an attorneys' fees exception into the Act. 103 The fourth court
minimized the importance of potential chilling of the attorney-client rela-
tionship and emphasized its belief that defense attorneys' actual trial per-
formances would not be affected.'°4
The court in United States v. Rogers 105 found that the threat of actual
forfeiture produced a chilling effect on the use of assets in securing coun-
96. In re Grand Jury Matters, 751 F.2d 13 (1st Cir. 1984).
97. Payden, 605 F. Supp. at 848 (quoting from In re Grand Jury Matters, 751 F.2d 13, 19
(1st Cir. 1984)).
98. 605 F. Supp. at 848.
99. 751 F.2d 13 (1st Cir. 1984).
100. The chilling effect results when a statute stops short of explicitly or impliedly denying
constitutional rights but creates enough uncertainty over its scope that parties deliberately
choose not to exercise questionably affected rights. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW § 12-30 (1978).
101. Id.
102. See laniello, slip op. at 8-10; Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. at 196-97; Payden, 605 F.
Supp. at 846-48; Rogers, 602 F. Supp. at 1348.
103. See Ianiello, slip op. at 8-10; Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. at 196-97; Rogers, 602 F.
Supp. at 1348.
104. See Payden, 605 F. Supp. at 848.
105. 602 F. Supp. 1332 (D. Colo. 1985).
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sel. 10 6 The court further held that the threat of future disclosure of confi-
dential fee information chilled the free communication that is necessary for
effective assistance of counsel.10 7 Specifically, in a RICO section 1963(m)
hearing on forfeitability of assets' 1° an attorney who wished to protect his
fees would need to disclose more than just his rate and the hours that he
expended on the case.'°9 Such a hearing would provide the government with
an opportunity to ascertain the attorney's knowledge of his client's assets
and financial situation." 0 The court noted that the menace of such a hear-
ing would prevent open communication between attorney and client, impair
the attorney's ability to represent his client effectively, and thus violate the
sixth amendment right to counsel."'I
The Rogers court also noted that inquiry into the scope of the defendant's
assets would divulge information that is crucial to the government's case
against the defendant.'1 2 Ignoring the apparent statutory intent that section
1963(m) hearings occur after the verdict, 1 3 the court concluded that infor-
mation that is made available to prosecutors at such a hearing greatly ex-
ceeded the scope of the attorneys' fee information exception to the attorney-
client privilege.' 14 The government thus would force withdrawal of attor-
neys by placing defense counsel in the dilemma of testifying at a 1963(m)
hearing or losing their fees.'1 5 The Rogers opinion noted that the govern-
ment could thus effectively rid the adversary process of the adversary." 6
In United States v. Ianiello '17 a New York district court also analyzed the
potential chilling effect of RICO section 1963(m)." 8 The court concluded
that the restriction upon a client's candor that would result from potential
disclosure of privileged material violated the sixth amendment right to effec-
tive representation. "19
In United States v. Badalamenti 120 the same court that decided Janiello
addressed the effects of RICO and CCE criminal forfeiture on the attorney-
client relationship in the context of a trial subpoena. The court noted, how-
ever, that forfeiture issues arise both at trial, when the government can seek
a special forfeiture verdict, and at post-trial hearings, on the attorney's right
to exemption from forfeiture as a bona fide purchaser for value who had no
106. Id. at 1349; see infra text accompanying notes 145-46.
107. 602 F. Supp. at 1348.
108. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1963(m) (West Supp. 1985).
109. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. at 1349.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1348-49.
112. Id. at 1349.
113. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1963(m) (West Supp. 1985).
114. 602 F. Supp. at 1349.
115. Id. at 1350.
116. Id.
117. No. S 85 Cr. 115, slip op. (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 1985).
118. Id. at 8-10.
119. Id. at 11.
120. 614 F. Supp. 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
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notice of the property's forfeitability. 12 1 The Badalamenti court relied pri-
marily on the Rogers court's reading of legislative history and held that
RICO and CCE forfeiture do not apply to attorneys' fees. 122
The court further determined that disclosure of fee information as proof of
defendant's illegal profits created a separate sixth amendment violation.1 23
The court did not address the threshold argument that potential disclosure
of confidential information chills the attorney-client relationship. Instead,
the court emphasized the effect of forcing defense counsel to withdraw due
to such disclosure. 124 The court reasoned that fee information is relevant to
whether a defendant received substantial profits from illegal activity. Conse-
quently, a good chance exists in CCE and RICO cases that the government
would require an attorney to divulge confidential information and thereby
cause him to withdraw from the case pursuant to the Code of Professional
Responsibility. 125
The court found that the potential for inducing withdrawal necessitated
application of a rigorous relevance and need standard to the subpoena. 126 In
Badalamenti the court quashed the subpoena because the government failed
to show substantial need for the evidence.127 The court also noted that be-
cause the government obtained the subpoena ten months after indictment
and six months after defense counsel's appearance, defendant's necessity to
replace counsel would more greatly prejudice his sixth amendment rights
than in a case in which counsel received a subpoena soon after his
appointment. 128
The potential chilling effect and loss of counsel arguments failed to per-
suade the trial court in Payden to hold that attorneys' fees were exempt from
forfeiture or that forfeiture violated the sixth amendment. In Payden de-
fense counsel received a grand jury subpoena duces tecum. 129 The defense
argued that testifying before the grand jury would chill the attorney-client
relationship and erode effective assistance of counsel.
The court conceded that potentially chilling disclosure can occur at three
stages in litigation: (1) by testimony of a nonconspirator witness, or by
counsel's stipulation; (2) by defense counsel's testimony at a grand jury pro-
ceeding; or (3) by testimony of such counsel at trial. 130 According to the
court, however, disclosure of the first type would not intrude on a defend-
121. Id. at 196; see 18 U.S.C.A. § 1963(m) (West Supp. 1985); 21 U.S.C.A. § 853(m) (West
Supp. 1985).
122. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. at 196-97.
123. 614 F. Supp. at 199.
124. Id.
125. Id. (citing MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-102(B) (1979)).
The disciplinary rule requires an attorney to withdraw from a case when he perceives that he
must testify to the possible prejudice of his client.
126. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. at 198.
127. Id. at 201.
128. Id. at 198 (citing In re Grand Jury Subpoena Served upon John Doe, Esq., 759 F.2d
968, 970 (2d Cir. 1985)).
129. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 44.
130. 605 F. Supp. at 850. The Payden court failed to consider the implications of the
fourth potential stage of disclosure in a RICO or CCE case, the § 1963(m) hearings.
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ant's rights at all.131 The court further asserted that disclosure of the second
type would not materially interfere with the advocate's function or deprive
the defendant of a fair trial.132 Thus, the court concluded that counsel's
appearance before a grand jury would not infringe on a defendant's sixth
amendment rights.
With respect to the third situation in which potentially chilling disclosure
can occur, the Payden court argued that although the Code of Professional
Responsibility requires counsel to withdraw upon testifying against his cli-
ent,133 such forced withdrawal does not qualify as a per se violation of the
defendant's right to effective counsel pursuant to the sixth amendment.
134
The court cited cases holding that withdrawal of counsel is an acceptable
alternative when counsel's testimony is necessary. 135 The court thus rea-
soned that a limited withdrawal could preserve a defendant's right to coun-
sel. 136 In this event counsel would not represent defendant before a jury, but
could continue to aid in defense preparations.
Thus, the Payden court held that the threat of disclosure at any of three
stages of litigation does not impair the defendant's right to counsel. In
reaching this conclusion, however, the court either ignored or did not seri-
ously consider the nature of the chilling effect argument. By focusing on
whether testimony before a grand jury or at trial would affect defense coun-
sel's preparation or trial performance, the Payden court neglected to con-
sider the inhibition of confidential trust and communication that would
result from the defendant's knowledge that his attorney might have to testify
and disclose information.
The Payden court also failed to address the fourth potential opportunity
for disclosure of confidential information: the section 1963(m) hearing. If
the government seeks forfeiture of attorneys' fees or seeks to establish that
the defendant had substantial undocumented income, the government may
subpoena defense counsel. In every case in which the government seeks for-
feiture of attorneys' fees, however, defense counsel must present an argu-
ment at a section 1963(m) hearing that he received his fees as a good faith
purchaser without notice of the fees' potential forfeitability.13 7 The certainty
of disclosure at such a hearing provides a greater chilling effect on client
communication than the possibility of disclosure from a subpoena. Thus,
although the Payden court presented a convincing argument that forced
withdrawal of counsel does not create an automatic violation of defendant's
sixth amendment rights, the court failed to respond fully to the more persua-
sive argument that the menace of potential disclosure of confidential client
information chills those same rights.
131. Id. at 850-51.
132. Id. at 851.
133. Id. at 852 (citing MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-102(B)
(1979)).
134. 605 F. Supp. at 852.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1963(m) (West Supp. 1985).
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3. Fee Disclosure as Inherently Prejudicial. One case involved a third argu-
ment against disclosure of fee information that such disclosure is inherently
prejudicial and violates defendant's right to counsel. In United States v.
Badalamenti defense counsel allegedly received a $500,000 retainer. 138 The
court reasoned that disclosing such information would put defense counsel's
credibility in issue and create juror resentment, even though the fee was
within the normal range charged by experienced and well-known lawyers in
complicated cases.1 39
B. The Implications of Attorneys' Fee Forfeiture on
the Attorney-Client Relationship
The second major area of analysis under RICO and CCE criminal forfei-
ture involves the implications of actual forfeiture of attorneys' fees. Courts
have addressed two arguments concerning a possible attorneys' fees excep-
tion under the statutes. The first argument proposes that attorneys may con-
stitute bona fide purchasers and thus be exempt from forfeiture. The second
argument suggests that courts should read an attorneys' fees exception into
the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984 to preserve the constitutionality
of the Act.
1. Attorneys as Bona Fide Purchasers. In United States v. Rogers a grand
jury in Colorado returned a thirty-count indictment alleging, inter alia, for-
feitures under RICO section 1963.140 The defense counsel responded with
motions to exclude attorneys' fees from forfeiture and objections to the gov-
ernment's request for restraining orders on transfer of the assets. Defense
counsel argued that the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act did not apply to fees
that are transferred to attorneys for performance of legitimate services and,
alternatively, that forced forfeiture of attorneys' fees violated the
Constitution. 141
Arguments concerning the intended scope of forfeitable property under
the Act are by nature speculative. Neither the sparse debate on the Act nor
its legislative history indicate whether the Act requires forfeiture of attor-
neys' fees, but the Act itself provides that assets that are transferred to a
third party are immune from forfeiture only when one of two conditions
exist. First, a third party does not forfeit transferred assets when the party
demonstrates that his title to the property predated the violation. 142 Second,
one who qualifies as a bona fide purchaser for value of property after the
violation without knowledge of the property's potential forfeitability may
retain the property. 143
The court in Rogers found that an attorney with knowledge of an indict-
ment against his client has sufficient notice of the potential forfeitability of
138. 614 F. Supp. at 197.
139. Id. at 201.
140. 602 F. Supp. at 1334.
141. Id.
142. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1963(c) (West Supp. 1985); 21 U.S.C.A. § 848(c) (1981).
143. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1963(c) (West Supp. 1985); 21 U.S.C.A. § 848(c) (1981).
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his client's assets and, therefore, does not qualify for the bona fide purchaser
exception. 14 Thus, an attorney's fees constitute forfeitable property unless
they are exempt from forfeiture for some other reason.' 45 The Rogers court
found the statutory language to be ambiguous and resorted to analysis of the
Act's legislative history to determine whether the court could void fee pay-
ments to attorneys.
The court chose a footnote in a passage from the legislative history that
gave several examples of situations that result in forfeitability of property.
The court construed a reference to "sham or fraudulent transactions" to
constitute an exclusive list of the circumstances in which forfeiture was in-
tended. 146 The court then concluded that Congress intended forfeiture to
apply only to sham or fraudulent transactions and asserted that since an
attorney who accepts fees engages in neither fraud nor sham, his fees are
exempt from forfeiture. 147
The Payden court, refusing to look past the inapplicability of the bona fide
purchaser rule, offered a different interpretation of the applicability of statu-
tory forfeiture actions to attorneys' fees. The court found the Rogers deci-
sion to be contrary to the text of the legislative history and concluded that
statutory language clearly established that attorneys could not be bona fide
purchasers unless, at the time that they accepted the fees, they reasonably
believed that they would not have to forfeit the defendant's property under
the Act. 148 The court applied precedent that held knowledge of an indict-
ment to be sufficient notice that assets are subject to forfeiture. 149 Since a
defense attorney should have actual notice of the contents of the indictment
of his client, the court rejected the bona fide purchaser argument as to
attorneys. 150
2. Judicially Implied Attorneys' Fees Exception. A second argument exists
for reading the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984 as containing the at-
torneys' fees exception. This argument relies on the principle of statutory
construction that a court should not interpret a statute so as to violate the
144. See 602 F. Supp. at 1346-47.
145. See id.
146. Id. at 1347; see SENATE FORFEITURE REPORT, supra note 10, at 209 n.47. The dis-
trict court also cited a passage from the legislative history of § 303 of the Act, amending the
criminal forfeiture provisions of CCE, which stated that "nothing in this section [dealing with
in personam forfeiture] is intended to interfere with a person's Sixth Amendment right to
counsel." 602 F. Supp. at 1347. Although the court correctly treated CCE's history as rele-
vant in interpreting RICO, it's statement of the obvious lends nothing to understanding forfei-
ture's applicability to attorneys and artificially creates an answer when no answer exists. For a
discussion of the difficulty some courts have in recognizing the relationship of RICO to CCE,
and the resulting reluctance to apply the legislative history of one to the other, see Note,
Continuing Criminal Enterprise Statute: Effect of Forfeiture Provision on Third Parties, 22
DUQ. L. REV. 171, 185-87 (1983).
147. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. at 1347.
148. Payden, 605 F. Supp. at 849 n.14.
149. Id. (citing United States v. Raimondo, 721 F.2d 476, 478 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
105 S. Ct. 133, 83 L. Ed. 2d 74 (1984); United States v. Long, 654 F.2d 911, 917 (3d Cir.
1981)).
150. 605 F. Supp. at 849 n.14.
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Constitution because Congress presumably could not have intended such a
result.151 This view assumes, however, that the statute threatens a defend-
ant's sixth amendment rights. Thus, analysis of the constitutional issues
concerning the right to counsel becomes a prerequisite to a determination of
the Act's applicability to attorneys' fees.
The courts have analyzed five major threats to the attorney-client relation-
ship resulting from forfeiture of attorneys' fees. Several involve analysis of
the dilemmas facing a defense attorney who is forced to balance economic
reality against ethical ideals. Two others represent more direct threats to the
very ability of a defendant to secure an attorney of his choice, or in extreme
instances, any attorney at all.
The first argument that is linked to actual forfeiture anticipates a more
serious threat to a defendant's sixth amendment rights than the chilling ef-
fect. The argument posits that forfeiture will not chill the right to counsel,
but deny it entirely. One court accepted an argument that defendants faced
with RICO and CCE forfeiture would be unable to retain counsel and un-
able to qualify for appointed counsel, a dilemma that completely deprives
them of any representation. 15 2 In United States v. Ianiello the court rea-
soned that a defendant with some legitimate sources of income did not meet
the indigency requirement in order to receive appointed counsel and thus did
not qualify for counsel appointed pursuant to the Criminal Justice Act. 153
In United States v. Badalamenti the court conceded that if the government
seized a defendant's assets pending forfeiture then he would clearly qualify
for appointed counsel. 154 That court, however, found sixth amendment
problems to exist when a court merely identified the defendant's assets as
forfeitable under RICO or CCE.155 It concluded that in such a situation
attorneys would probably refuse to represent the defendant for fear of not
receiving payment for their services. 156
In reality the dilemma identified by the two courts does not exist. The
language of the Criminal Justice Act requires only that a defendant be finan-
cially unable to retain counsel, not totally destitute. 157 The court in Ianiello
admitted that the Criminal Justice Act allowed the judge great discretion in
151. See Rogers, 602 F. Supp. at 1348; 2A SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
§ 45.11 (4th ed. 1984).
152. Ianiello, slip op. at 11-13. The Criminal Justice Act of 1964, § 2, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3006A(a) (1982), directs a court to appoint counsel for anyone who cannot afford to retain
counsel. Rule 44 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure reinforces the broad discretion-
ary powers of judges in granting court-appointed counsel. The rule provides that "[e]very
defendant who is unable to obtain counsel shall be entitled to have counsel assigned to repre-
sent him at every stage of the proceedings from his initial appearance before the federal magis-
trate or the court through appeal, unless he waives such appointment." FED. R. CRIM. P. 44.
153. Slip op. at 11-13; 18 U.S.C. § 3006(a) (1982).
154. 614 F. Supp. at 200.
155. Id. at 197-98.
156. Id.
157. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a) (1982). Closely associated with the right to appointed counsel
is the question whether appointed counsel can provide adequate representation in extremely
complicated and protracted RICO and CCE litigation. The Rogers and Payden courts ac-
knowledged the importance of the question, but no case has fully litigated the issue. See
Payden, 605 F. Supp. at 852; Rogers, 602 F. Supp. at 1349-50.
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reviewing an application for appointed counsel. 158 Judges should thus will-
ingly appoint counsel given the dire constitutional implications of denying it.
Furthermore, the U.S. Attorney's Office asserted in Janiello that it would
not contest appointment of counsel in similar situations.159
The court in United States v. Rogers addressed a second threat to the at-
torney-client relationship. The defense alleged that a pretrial threat of forfei-
ture or a RICO and CCE restraining order on assets would create a chilling
effect on the defendant's right to counsel of his choice. Such a threat might
deter counsel with knowledge of the potential of forfeiture from representing
defendants charged with RICO or CCE violations. A logical extension of
that argument arose in Rogers and faniello, in which retained counsel en-
tered conditional appearances. 160 Counsel in both cases threatened to with-
draw if the court found the attorneys' fees forfeitable. The Payden court
responded to a related argument that the prospect of forfeiting attorneys'
fees would dissuade counsel from vigorous representation of a client. 161 The
canons of professional responsibility require defense counsel to work zeal-
ously for a client regardless of the risk of forfeiting attorneys' fees. 162
Although the Payden opinion did not address the problem of conditional
appearances, an attorney who makes a full appearance in a case involving
forfeiture clearly faces a dilemma. The attorney must either continue to
render services for which he may not receive payment or withdraw, violate
the code of ethics, and face possible disciplinary action.
A third threat to the attorney-client relationship arises from substantive
forfeiture provisions. Attorneys who take the risk of having their fees for-
feited actually violate the Code of Professional Responsibility because the fee
is, in effect, a contingent fee in a criminal case. 163 An attorney who accepted
a CCE or RICO case with knowledge that the government alleged forfeita-
bility of attorneys' fees would thus take a case in which payment depended
upon securing acquittal of the client.
A fourth threat addresses the conflict of interests facing an attorney when
his interest in keeping his fee is adverse to his client's best interest. The
courts in Ianiello and Badalamenti addressed variations of the conflict of
interest argument. The Janiello court found that the threat of losing a fee
may induce an attorney to push his client to plea bargain, or, conversely, to
risk going to trial to seek an unlikely acquittal instead of advising his client
to plead guilty and thus lose the fee. 164 The Badalamenti court found an
additional conflict for defense counsel. Attorneys must diligently represent
158. Slip op. at 13.
159. Id.
160. laniello, slip op. at 4-7; Rogers, 602 F. Supp. at 1349.
161. 605 F. Supp. at 848; see United States v. Ramey, 559 F. Supp. 60, 62 (E.D. Tenn.
1981).
162. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-101(A)(2) (1979); see
Payden, 605 F. Supp. at 848; People v. Woods, 117 Misc. 2d 1, 2, 457 N.Y.S.2d 173, 175 (Sup.
Ct. 1982).
163. laniello, slip op. at 9; see MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-
106(c) (1979).
164. Slip op. at 13-14.
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their clients, 1 65 but through such diligence may discover that their fees came
from the proceeds of illegal activity.1 66 In response to similar arguments the
Payden court invoked rules requiring attorneys to avoid conflicts of interest
and to withdraw if faced with unavoidable conflicts.167 The court reasoned
that appointed counsel would provide conflict-free representation and con-
cluded that the criminal justice system should not allow defendants to hire
the finest attorneys with ill-gotten gains.168
One last threat, which the Rogers court initially discussed, involves
prosecutorial discretion and its effect on the attorney-client relationship.
The Rogers court recognized that the right to seek forfeiture gives to the
government the power to force withdrawal of opposing counsel until an at-
torney whom the state does not perceive to be a threat is chosen or ap-
pointed.169 The court presumed that prosecutors would not manipulate
opposing counsel, but nonetheless concluded that even the opportunity for
such abusive practices presented an intolerable threat to due process.' 70 The
defense bar has focused its objections on the possibility that prosecutors will
use the threat of forfeiture for "attorney shopping" until a defendant chooses
an inexperienced or incapable defense attorney or seeks appointed coun-
sel. 171 The Rogers court reasoned that in a RICO or CCE case counsel ap-
pointed soon before trial would lack the adequate preparation necessary to
provide effective representation.1 72
Although the courts' concerns regarding actual forfeiture of attorneys'
fees merit notice, they do not threaten the attorney-client relationship to as
great an extent as do the problems associated with disclosure of confidential
client information.1 73 First, the availability of court-appointed counsel pro-
vides a safety net for a defendant's constitutional rights. As long as courts
may appoint counsel, a defendant who is unable to retain counsel due to
potential forfeitability of fees or one whose counsel withdraws a conditional
appearance or withdraws for ethical reasons will not experience a denial of
his sixth amendment right to an attorney. Additionally, defense disciplinary
rules that regulate all attorneys' behavior prohibit defense attorneys from
manipulating their clients to protect the attorneys' fees' 74 and prohibit pros-
ecutors from threatening forfeiture as a means of creating a conflict of inter-
165. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-101(A)(1) (1979).
166. 614 F. Supp. at 196-97. The knowledge that an attorney might gain through dili-
gently seeking information regarding his client's problem could conceivably prevent the attor-
ney from qualifying as a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of the potential
forfeitability of his client's property. 21 U.S.C.A. § 1963(m) (West Supp. 1985); 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 853(n) (West Supp. 1985).
167. 605 F. Supp. at 850.
168. Id.
169. 602 F. Supp. at 1350.
170. Id.
171. See Statement of Meshbesher, supra note 15, at D-9.
172. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. at 1350-51.
173. See supra notes 74-88 and accompanying text.
174. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105(A), 7-101(A)(1) (1979).
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est between a defense counsel and his client.175 Even if such situations
should arise, a defendant may seek a post-conviction remedy when any at-
torney's behavior constitutes a violation of the constitutional guarantee of
effective assistance of counsel.176 The impact of actual forfeiture of attor-
neys' fees thus fails to provide adequate grounds for judicial creation of an
attorneys' fees exception to the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984.
IV. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE RESPONSE TO THE PERCEIVED THREATS
OF ATTORNEYS' FEE FORFEITURE
Three of the four district courts that have addressed the applicability of
criminal forfeiture to attorneys' fees have agreed that Congress could not
have intended to make attorneys' fees forfeitable or fee information subject
to subpoena. '77 The courts relied on arguments that individually fall short
of proving the conclusion that forfeiture of attorneys' fees violates a defend-
ant's sixth amendment right to counsel and thus found it necessary to create
an exception to a statute that Congress clearly intended to apply as broadly
and uniformly as possible. 178 Furthermore, the courts ignored the distinc-
tion between effects of disclosure of fee information and effects of forfeiture
itself.
The one court that was unpersuaded by challenges to the statute provides
a similarly unjustifiable approach to the sixth amendment implications of
forfeiture of attorneys' fees. The Payden court failed to consider adequately
the chilling effect that disclosure of fee information poses. 179 Additionally,
as a result of the court's failure to recognize the forfeiture-disclosure distinc-
tion, it disregarded potential judicial application of procedural remedies that
could alleviate disclosure-related sixth amendment problems.
The Department of Justice quickly reacted to judicial concern over forced
disclosure of attorney fee information by promulgating guidelines that re-
strict subpoenas of attorneys.180 These guidelines require that the Assistant
Attorney General authorize all subpoenas and that the Department make all
reasonable attempts to obtain the information from alternate sources or vol-
untarily from the attorney prior to such authorization.' 8' Significantly, the
guidelines acknowledge the risk of disqualification posed to subpoenaed at-
torneys and require that the government's need for the information outweigh
any such risk, and further require that the subpoenaed information not be
175. See id. DR 1-102(A)(5); see also id. EC 7-14 (government attorney should not use
sovereign's power to harass parties or to impede just settlements or results).
176. See L. YACKLE, POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES §§ 30-32, 152-54 (1981) (analysis of
postconviction remedies available to federal defendants).
177. See Ianiello, slip op. at 8-10; Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. at 196-97; Rogers, 602 F.
Supp. at 1348.
178. See Payden, 605 F. Supp. at 850 (analysis of congressional concern over expansive
interpretation of forfeiture).
179. Id.
180. See Justice Department Issues Guidelines on Subpoenas to Attorneys, (Apr.-Sept.] 37
CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 2479 (Sept. 25, 1985).
181. Id. at 2480.
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subject to any privilege. 182 The guidelines are an important step toward pro-
tecting the attorney-client relationship because placing the power to author-
ize subpoenas in the hands of the Assistant Attorney General prevents local
prosecutors from using the threat of a subpoena to "attorney shop." The
balancing test provided by the guidelines, however, fails to take into account
the greater threat posed by chilling of the attorney-client relationship.
A more satisfactory approach exists in a proposal made to the Depart-
ment of Justice by the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers
(NACDL).1 83 The NACDL proposal replaces the ambiguous and easily
manipulated balancing test of the Department of Justice guidelines with the
requirement that the Assistant Attorney General not approve a subpoena
request unless reasonable grounds exist to believe that the defendant has
committed a crime and that his attorney has also engaged in criminal activ-
ity. 184 This standard is more stringent than anything suggested by the
courts or by the Department of Justice thus far and would adequately safe-
guard the attorney-client relationship from any threat of prosecutorial ma-
nipulation or chiling effect.
The possible chilling effect posed by RICO and CCE post-forfeiture hear-
ings185 is a more difficult problem than the chilling effect posed by trial or
grand jury testimony. Neither RICO nor CCE explicitly provides proce-
dural safeguards for post-verdict forfeiture hearings.186 The Department of
Justice, recognizing this problem, has also promulgated guidelines specifi-
cally addressed to forfeiture of attorneys' fees.' 87 Although the guidelines
acknowledge that post-forfeiture hearings may disrupt communication be-
tween an attorney and his client, the guidelines merely require prosecutors to
take that potential disruption into consideration when seeking forfeiture,
18 8
which clearly represents an inadequate solution to protection of the attor-
ney-client relationship.
Dictum in the Rogers opinion implies a better alternative. The main pur-
pose of a post-forfeiture hearing is to give parties who face forfeiture an op-
portunity to show that they were bona fide purchasers of the allegedly
forfeitable property. 189 The Rogers court determined that a bona fide pur-
chaser is one who takes property without notice of possible forfeiture. 190
The court concluded that an attorney has notice of potential forfeitability of
182. Id.
183. See Statement of Meshbesher, supra note 15, at D-1.
184. See id. at D-5.
185. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1963(m) (West Supp. 1985); see 21 U.S.C.A. § 853(n) (West Supp.
1985).
186. See Rogers, 602 F. Supp. at 1351.
187. See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MAN-
UAL § 9-111.230 (1985) [hereinafter cited as ATTORNEYS' MANUAL]. The fee forfeiture guide-
lines require an attorney to prove that he had no notice of the possible forfeiture of the assets,
yet concede that this requirement may impede the flow of information between the attorney
and his client. Id.
188. Id.
189. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. at 1346-49.
190. Id. at 1351. The fee forfeiture guidelines provide extensive notice requirements. See
ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 187, § 9-111.500.
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property due to the indictment that his client faces. 191 Thus, since the case
law indicates that notice of forfeitability is implicit in an indictment, in the
case of attorneys, a post-forfeiture hearing has no meaning; therefore, the
court could eliminate the hearing for attorneys without jeopardizing any
constitutional right. The result is an elimination of any potential chilling
effect resulting from post-trial disclosure.
The last objection to forfeiture of attorneys' fees was the potential chilling
effect on the ability of a defendant to retain counsel of his choice.' 92 Two
courts expressed a fear that counsel appointed shortly before trial would not
provide effective assistance in a complex RICO or CCE case. 193 Although
such fears may have some justification, only defendants with legitimate as-
sets have the right to choose their counsel.194 When the government places
a restraining order on a defendant's assets or threatens to institute forfeiture
proceedings, then that defendant qualifies for federally appointed counsel. 195
If the appointed counsel performed inadequately, then the defendant could
seek post-conviction relief, asserting a violation of his constitutional right to
effective assistance of counsel.
196
Subsequent to unfavorable verdicts in three of the four district court cases
addressing criminal forfeiture, the government has apparently abandoned its
efforts to apply vigorously the new forfeiture provisions of CCE and
RICO. 197 Recently promulgated guidelines and one court of appeals' refusal
to address the forfeiture issues, however, indicate that strict interpretation of
the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984 may still prevail. Although the
potential for constitutional violations accompanying such an interpretation
is serious, by enforcing available procedural safeguards the Department of
Justice can meet the goals of the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984
without creating an artificial and unneeded attorneys' fees exception.
191. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. at 1346-49.
192. Id. at 1348.
193. Payden, 605 F. Supp. at 852; Rogers, 602 F. Supp. at 1349-50.
194. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. at 1348.
195. See Criminal Justice Act of 1964, § 2, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1982); FED. R. CRIM. P.
44.
196. See supra note 176.
197. See United States v. Sheehan, No. 84-198 (E.D. Cal. filed Aug. 9, 1985) (government
withdrew forfeiture allegations, but attempted to reserve right to allege forfeiture after verdict).
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